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Abstract	  Political	   interest	   groups	   interact	   with	   their	   environment	   to	   communicate	  their	   points	   of	   view	   and	   to	   achieve	   political	   goals.	   However,	   lobbying	  consumes	   valuable	   resources,	   and	   interest	   groups	   have	   to	   decide	   which	  audiences	  to	  target	  and	  how	  to	  allocate	  scarce	  resources.	  Adopting	  a	  political	  economy	  view,	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  organizations	  we	  study	  behave	  as	  rational	  actors	  and	  allocate	  the	  funds	  earmarked	  for	  lobbying	  and	  communication	  in	  a	  way	   that	   maximizes	   the	   intended	   impacts.	   Recipients	   of	   communication	  perceived	   as	   more	   important	   are	   therefore	   expected	   to	   be	   targeted	   more	  often.	  In	  this	  article,	  we	  study	  what	  determines	  this	  perception	  of	  importance	  of	   four	   target	   groups	   of	   lobbying	   for	   Swiss	   and	   German	   interest	   groups:	  parties,	  the	  government,	  the	  media	  and	  the	  general	  public.	  More	  specifically,	  we	   examine	   how	   interest	   group	   characteristics	   influence	   the	   perceived	  importance	   of	   these	   target	   audiences.	   Examples	   of	   such	   characteristics,	   for	  which	  we	  derive	  hypotheses,	  are	  the	  sectors	  of	  activity	  of	  interest	  groups,	  the	  organizations’	   size	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   individual	   and	   group	  membership,	   the	  overall	   annual	   budget,	   etc.	   To	   investigate	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   various	  hypotheses,	  a	  dataset	  derived	  from	  a	  survey	  among	  all	  politically	  active	  Swiss	  and	   German	   interest	   groups	   is	   used	   (response	   rate	   40%	   and	   23%	  respectively).	   For	   further	   analysis,	   we	   rely	   on	   ordered	   logit	  models	   to	   test	  which	   interest	   group	   characteristics	   influence	   the	   perceived	   importance	   of	  the	  four	  identified	  target	  audiences.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  paper	  draws	  on	  research	  conducted	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  national	  competence	  center	  in	  research	  (NCCR)	  “Challenges	  to	  Democracy	  in	  the	  21st	  century”,	  funded	  by	  the	  Swiss	  National	  Science	  Foundation	  (SNSF).	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Introduction	  Political	  interest	  groups,	  as	  a	  distinctive	  type	  of	  political	  organizations,	  can	  choose	  from	  a	  wide	  repertoire	  of	  strategies	  to	  reach	  their	  organizational	  goals.	  As	  the	  interest	  group	  universe	   itself	   is	   by	   nature	   very	   heterogeneous	   and	   diverse,	   a	   variety	   of	   different	  “organisational	  animals”	  (Jordan,	  Beyers,	  &	  Maloney,	  2004,	  p.	  196)	   is	  subsumed	  under	  the	   term	   “interest	   group”,	   each	   with	   its	   history,	   position	   in	   the	   political	   systems	   and	  resources.	  These	  are,	  however,	  only	  a	  few	  of	  the	  organizational	  characteristics	  which	  are	  important	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   different	   strategies.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   “that	   all	  groups	   are	   not	   the	   same	   and	   that	   underlying	   their	   policy	   function	   is	   a	   heterogeneous	  array	   of	   organisational	   and	   representative	   functions”	   (Jordan	   et	   al.,	   2004,	   p.	   206).	  Different	  groups	  employ	  different	  strategies	  (Binderkrantz,	  2008).	  The	  “tactic	  selection	  is	  better	  understood	  by	  dividing	  it	  into	  its	  two	  distinct	  components:	  inside	  lobbying	  and	  outside	  lobbying”	  (Mahoney,	  2008,	  p.	  34).	  These	  two	  forms	  adhere	  to	  the	  political	  arena	  interest	   groups	   decide	   to	   present	   their	   policy	   views:	   While	   the	   backstage	   –	   inside	  lobbying	   –	   encompasses	   “the	   world	   of	   advisory	   bodies,	   committees,	   agencies,	   and,	   to	  some	   extent,	   parliamentary	   committees”	   and	   “is	   not	   or	   only	   partly	   visible	   to	   a	   larger	  audience”	   (Beyers,	   2008,	   p.	   1189),	   the	   front	   stage	   (outside	   lobbying)	   is,	   at	   least	  potentially,	  exposed	  to	  a	  more	  general	  public	  and	  subject	  to	  media	  scrutiny.	  In	  contexts,	  where	   communication	   –	  mediated	   or	   in	   the	  mass	  media,	   respectively	   –	   is	   of	   growing	  importance,	  as	  suggested	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  Mediatization	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Mazzoleni	  &	  Schulz,	   1999),	   outside	   lobbying	   should	   be	   adequately	   integrated	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	  strategies	   implemented	   by	   interest	   groups.	   While	   interest	   group	   approaches	   have	  tended	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  inside	  lobbying	  strategies	  (Beyers,	  2008,	  p.	  1188-­‐1189),	  recent	  publications	  have	  taken	  the	  importance	  attributed	  to	  media-­‐related	  aspects	  of	  the	  topic	  into	  account	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Binderkrantz,	  2012).	  Is	  thus	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  add	  to	   the	  discussion	  about	  which	   factors	  are	   important	   in	  determining	  a	  political	   interest	  group’s	   strategy,	   covering	   aspects	   commonly	   associated	   with	   inside,	   as	   well	   as	   with	  outside	   lobbying.	   In	  doing	   so,	  we	  present	   evidence	   from	  Germany	  and	  Switzerland,	   to	  shed	  some	  more	  light	  on	  the	  ongoing	  discussion	  about	  the	  role	  of	  (financial)	  resources	  in	  explaining	  the	  tactics	  employed	  by	  political	  interest	  groups	  (Dür	  &	  Mateo,	  2012;	  2013).	  In	   line	   with	   McKay	   (2012),	   we	   wish	   to	   help	   in	   shaping	   a	   more	   “nuanced	   approach”	  (McKay,	  2012,	  p.	  908)	  of	  the	  role	  and	  effects	  of	  money	  in	  policymaking.	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The	   remainder	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   organized	   as	   follows.	   In	   the	   next	   section,	   we	   briefly	  present	   our	   research	  questions,	   before	   turning	   to	   the	   empirical	   analysis,	   to	  which	   the	  main	  part	  of	  this	  paper	  dedicated.	  We	  present	  and	  derive	  the	  corresponding	  hypotheses	  in	   section	   3.	   Section	   4	   describes	   the	   operationalization	   of	   the	  models	  we	   used,	   while	  section	  5	  contains	  the	  results	  of	  our	  empirical	  analysis.	  We	  conclude	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  empirical	  results	  in	  section	  6.	  
	  
Research	  Questions	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  aim	  to	  investigate	  the	  factors	  which	  can	  help	  to	  explain	  the	  importance	  attributed	  to	  different	  strategies	  of	  political	  interest	  groups	  in	  Germany	  and	  Switzerland.	  Our	  main	  research	  question	  to	  be	  investigated	  is	  thus:	  
Research	  Question:	  Which	  factors	  determine	  the	  importance	  of	  inside	  and	  outside	  lobbying	  
for	  political	  interest	  groups	  in	  Germany	  and	  Switzerland?	  	  	  
Hypotheses:	  First,	   we	   focus	   on	   the	   material	   endowment	   of	   an	   organization.	   We	   expect	   financial	  resources	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  lobbying	  tactics.	  Schlozman	  and	  Tierney	   (1986,	   p.	   161)	   note	   that	   “the	   [perhaps]	   most	   important	   factor	   affecting	   an	  organization’s	   strategic	   choice	  of	   lobbying	   techniques	   is	   its	   resources”.	  The	  higher	   the	  spending	  power	  of	  organizations,	   the	  more	   they	  are	  able	   to	   invest	   in	  expensive	   inside	  and	   outside	   lobbying	   tactics,	   and	   the	   better	   they	   are	   able	   to	   diversify	   their	   tactics.	   In	  particular,	  inside	  lobbying	  strategies	  are	  seen	  as	  very	  costly	  and	  therefore	  reserved	  for	  resource	  rich	  groups,	  while	  outside	  lobbying	  is	  sometimes	  regarded	  as	  a	  strategy	  for	  the	  weak	   (Grant	   2000).	   Therefore,	   pressure	   groups	   with	   bigger	   budgets	   are	   expected	   to	  exhibit	   a	   higher	   usage	   of	   inside	   lobbying	   tactics	   than	   their	   less	   well	   endowed	   peers.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  more	  resources	  not	  also	  increase	  outside	  lobbying,	  e.g.	  a	  wealthy	   and	  big	   pressure	   group	   is	   likely	   to	   have	   a	   closer	   relationship	  with	   the	  media	  than	   small,	   relatively	   poor	   groups.	   This	   point	   has	   been	   made	   by	   Thrall	   (2006),	   who	  notes	   that	   an	   organization’s	   resource	   endowment	   is	   the	   single	   most	   important	  determinant	  of	   its	   ability	   to	   influence	   the	  media,	   and	   thus	   to	  employ	  outside	   lobbying	  strategies	   successfully.	   For	   our	   purpose,	   we	   hypothesize	   that	   outside	   lobbying	   is	  positively	  influenced	  by	  an	  organization’s	  resource	  wealth	  as	  well,	  which	  is	  also	  in	  line	  with	   Mahoney’s	   (2008,	   p.	   43)	   expectation	   that	   “financial	   resources	   tend	   to	   highly	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correlate	  with	  […]	  the	  number	  of	  inside	  lobbying	  tactics	  an	  organization	  employs	  [and]	  the	  level	  of	  outside	  lobbying”.	  However,	  following	  Dür	  and	  Mateo	  (2013),	  we	  expect	  the	  effect	  to	  be	  stronger	  for	  inside	  lobbying	  tactics.	  	  H1:	   Resource	   rich	   interest	   groups	   are	   expected	   use	   both	   inside	   and	   outside	   lobbying	  tactics	  more	  extensively	  than	  less	  well	  endowed	  organizations.	  	  The	  membership	  base	  is	  an	  important	  resource	  for	  interest	  groups	  and	  influences	  which	  lobbying	   tactics	   organizations	   employ.	   For	   example,	   Thrall	   (2006)	   shows	   empirically,	  that	  groups	  with	  more	  members	  use	  outside	   lobbying	  strategies	  more	   frequently.	  And	  Schlozman	  and	  Tierney	  (1986)	  state	  that	  “the	  size	  […]	  of	  an	  organization’s	  membership	  may	  also	  dictate	   its	   choice	  of	   lobbying	   techniques;	   if	   there	  are	  many	  members	   spread	  throughout	   most	   congressional	   districts,	   and	   if	   the	   organization	   has	   the	   means	   to	  mobilize	   them,	   a	   campaign	   of	   grass	   roots	   pressure	   may	   be	   an	   option”.	   Such	   a	  mobilization	  of	  the	  public,	  however,	  is	  not	  only	  possible	  directly	  via	  the	  members	  of	  the	  organization.	  Another	  possibility	  is	  to	  raise	  awareness	  for	  an	  issue	  in	  the	  public	  via	  the	  news	  media.	  But	  even	  in	  such	  cases,	  an	  organization	  with	  broad	  membership	  has	  more	  ways	  to	  bring	  their	  concerns	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  press,	  and	  an	  easier	  time	  to	  keep	  the	  debate	   alive	   than	   small	   or	   memberless	   organizations.	   (Mahoney,	   2008,	   p.	   152).	   We	  therefore	  expect	  outside	  lobbying	  to	  be	  employed	  more	  frequently	  as	  groups	  increase	  in	  size.	  	  Individual	  membership,	  however,	  is	  not	  the	  only	  form	  of	  membership	  possible	  in	  many	  pressure	   groups.	   Often,	   firms	   or	   other	   organizations	   are	   invited	   to	   become	  members,	  and	  for	  452	  organizations	   in	  our	  dataset	  this	   is	  the	  only	  possible	  form	  of	  membership.	  We	  believe	  that	  this	  form	  of	  membership	  evokes	  a	  different	  kind	  of	   lobbying	  behavior,	  namely	  one	  more	  focused	  on	  insider	  tactics.	  We	  assume	  that	  groups	  with	  firms	  or	  other	  organizations	   as	   members	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   firmly	   established	   in	   the	   political	  system,	  with	   a	   central	   and	  prominent	   role	   close	   to	   political	   decision-­‐makers	   (political	  “insiders”).	  These	  types	  of	  organizations	  could	  employ	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  lobbying	  strategies,	  as	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  the	  financial	  resources	  to	  do	  so,	  but	  in	  line	  with	  Dür	  and	  Mateo	  (2013,	  p.	  663),	  we	  believe	  that	  they	  will	  prefer	  inside	   lobbying	  over	  media-­‐related	  tactics,	  as	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  more	  effective.	  As	  these	  groups	  have	  privileged	  access	  to	  political	   decision-­‐makers,	   they	   do	   not	   see	   the	   necessity	   to	   expose	   themselves	   more	  publicly.	   Even	   if	   a	   political	   interest	   group	   with	   a	   large	   number	   of	   organizational	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members	   is	   active	   in	  a	  political	   sector,	  where	  we	  hypothesize	   that	  outside	   lobbying	   is	  important,	   like	   in	   environmental	   politics,	   for	   example,	   it	   will	   be	   more	   dependent	   on	  inside	   than	   outside	   lobbying.	   Hence	   we	   expect	   a	   positive	   relationship	   between	   the	  number	   of	   organizational	   members	   a	   specific	   group	   has	   and	   inside	   lobbying.	   Groups	  with	  organizational	  members	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  have	  fewer	  members,	  in	  sheer	  numbers,	  than	   groups	   with	   individual	   members.	   The	   fewer	   members	   a	   group	   has,	   the	   less	  problems	  with	  collective	  action	  it	  should	  potentially	  face.	  Dür	  and	  Mateo	  point	  out	  that	  “groups	   struggling	   with	   collective	   action	   problems	   will	   always	   have	   an	   incentive	   to	  engage	  in	  outside	  lobbying”	  (2013,	  p.	  664).	  Conversely,	  this	  could	  mean	  that	  groups	  with	  other	   organizations	   as	   members	   do	   have	   fewer	   incentives	   to	   use	   outside	   tactics	   and	  should	  instead	  rely	  more	  heavily	  on	  inside	  lobbying.	  Furthermore,	  group	  members	  have	  their	  very	  own	  agendas	  clearly	  laid	  out,	  and	  groups	  generally	  are	  much	  better	  connected	  than	   individuals,	   which	   will	   help	   organizations	   they	   are	  members	   of	   to	   get	   access	   to	  decision	  makers.	  	  H2a:	   The	   more	   individual	   members	   an	   interest	   group	   has,	   the	   more	   it	   will	   rely	   on	  outside	  lobbying.	  H2b:	   The	  more	   group	  members	   (corporations,	   other	   organizations)	   an	   interest	   group	  has,	  the	  more	  it	  will	  rely	  on	  inside	  lobbying.	  	  Next,	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  level	  of	  competition	  an	  organization	  faces	  within	  the	  policy	  field	  it	  is	  active	  in.	  In	  other	  words,	  with	  how	  many	  other	  interest	  groups	  in	  the	  policy	  field	  has	  an	  organization	  to	  compete	  for	  attention	  of	  policy	  makers	  and	  the	  public?	  Pressure	  groups	  have	  to	  consider	  the	  positions	  and	  counter-­‐lobbying	  strategies	  of	  their	  opponents,	  when	  deciding	  on	  their	  own	  lobbying	  tactics	  (Salisbury,	  1990).	  	  Heclo	   (1978)	   observes	   that	   a	   groups	  working	   on	   the	   same	   policy	   issues	   usually	   have	  different	  opinions	  on	  how	  the	  policy	  should	  be	  resolved.	  Many	  groups,	  and	   thus	  many	  conflicting	  opinions	  and	  positions,	  in	  one	  policy	  area	  are	  therefore	  an	  indication	  that	  the	  level	   of	   competition	   in	   this	   particular	   policy	   field	   is	   high.	   In	   such	   circumstances,	   one	  group’s	  benefit	  (i.e.	  enforcing	  its	  policy	  preference)	  would	  be	  another	  group’s	  loss.	  When	  adversarial	   interests	   threaten	   the	   welfare	   of	   groups	   in	   this	   manner,	   they	   respond	   by	  lobbying	  the	  government	  more	  intensely	  (Holyoke,	  2009).	  Thus,	  we	  expect	  groups	  active	  in	  highly	  contested	  areas	  to	  increase	  their	  use	  of	  inside	  lobbying	  strategies,	  as	  they	  react	  to,	  but	  also	  anticipate,	  their	  opponents’	  lobbying	  strategies.	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This	   increased	  use	  of	   inside	   lobbying	   tactics	  when	   competition	   is	  high,	   however,	   does	  not	  preclude	   the	  use	  of	   outside	   lobbying.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   highly	   contested	   issues	   are	  very	   likely	   to	   go	   public,	   first	   of	   all	   because	   “a	   high-­‐profile	   area	   […]	   is	   unlikely	   to	   be	  resolved	   without	   wide	   participation	   and	   parliamentary	   legitimation”	   (Jordan	   and	  Richardson,	  1987,	  p.	  21).	  The	   second	   reason	  why	  high-­‐conflict	   issues	  go	  public	   is	   that	  some	   organizations	   involved	  might	   find	   it	   advantageous	   to	   bring	   the	   debate	   into	   the	  public	   domain	   (Mahoney,	   2008).	   This,	   in	   turn,	   will	   force	   opposing	   organizations	   to	  expand	   their	   use	   of	   outside	   lobbying	   tactics	   as	   well.	   Organizations	   in	   little	   contested	  issue	   areas	   often	   have	   close	   ties	   to	   governments	   and	   bureaucracies.	   Hence	   their	  incentives	   to	   influence	  public	   opinion	   and	   to	  discuss	   their	   interests	   publicly	   are	  weak	  (Grant,	  2000,	  p.	  192-­‐193).	  	  	  H3:	   Interest	   groups	   active	   in	   more	   contested	   issue	   areas	   employ	   inside	   and	   outside	  lobbying	  tactics	  more	  heavily	  than	  groups	  in	  less	  competitive	  areas.	  	  Different	  types	  of	  interest	  groups	  pursue	  different	  lobbying	  strategies	  to	  influence	  public	  policy.	  For	  some	  groups	  direct	  access	  to	  politicians	  (inside	  lobbying)	  is	  most	  relevant	  for	  achieving	   their	   goals,	  while	   other	   groups	   apply	   outside	   lobbying	   tactics	   and	   appeal	   to	  the	  public	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  policy	  makers	  (Scholzman	  &	  Tierney	  1986;;	  Bindenkrantz	  2008).	   In	   the	   literature	   groups	   are	   often	   classified	   as	   falling	   into	   the	   following	  categories:	   citizen	   groups,	   foundations,	   professional	   associations,	   and	   business	  associations	   (Mahoney,	   2008;	   Dür	   &	  Mateo,	   2013).	   The	   expectations	   are	   that	   citizens	  groups	  (and	  foundations)	  use	  outside	  lobbying	  strategies	  more	  extensively	  than	  groups	  in	  the	  other	  categories,	  while	  business	  organization	  rely	  more	  heavily	  on	  inside	  lobbying	  tactics.	  	  We	  use	  a	   somewhat	  different	   categorization	  of	   interest	  groups	  and	  distinguish	  groups	  according	   to	   the	   policy	   area	   they	   are	   mostly	   concerned	   with.	   More	   specifically,	   we	  differentiate	   between	   business/economic	   interest	   groups,	   environmental	   interest	  groups,	  and	  the	  groups	  predominantly	  active	  in	  other	  political	  sectors.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  our	  first	  category,	  business	  and	  economic	  interest	  groups,	  corresponds	  to	  the	  business	  organizations	   used	   in	   other	   studies.	  We	   expect	   these	   groups	   to	   pursue	   the	   economic	  interests	  of	   their	  members	  only,	   and	   therefore	   to	   rely	  more	  on	   inside	   lobbying	   tactics	  than	   the	   other	   groups.	   On	   the	   other	   side	   of	   the	   spectrum	   are	   environmental	   interest	  groups,	  who	  we	  consider	  to	  come	  closest	  to	  the	  category	  citizens	  groups	  used	  by	  other	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researchers.	   Environmental	   interest	   groups	   usually	   pursue	   goals	   they	   believe	   are	  favorable	   for	   the	   general	   public,	   hence	   we	   expect	   them	   to	   pursue	   outside	   lobbying	  strategies	  more	  often	  than	  lobbying	  organizations	  in	  the	  other	  categories.	  	  	  H4:	  Business	  groups	  use	   inside	   lobbying	  strategies,	  and	  environmental	   interest	  groups	  pursue	  outside	  lobbying	  tactics	  more	  intensely	  than	  other	  lobby	  organizations.	  	  	  
Operationalization	  of	  the	  model:	  	  To	  obtain	  data	  on	   lobbying	  behavior,	  we	  carried	  out	  surveys	  among	  interest	  groups	   in	  Switzerland	   and	   Germany.	   First,	   we	   compiled	   a	   list	   of	   pressure	   groups	   from	   both	  countries	   following	   the	  method	   suggested	   by	  Wonka	   et.	   al.	   (2010).	  We	   systematically	  screened	   the	   existing	   registries	   for	   Switzerland	   and	   Germany	   for	   politically	   active	  interest	  groups.	  The	  different	  registries	  were	  then	  merged	  and	  duplicate	  entries	  deleted.	  In	  this	  coding	  process,	  we	  include	  the	  main	  level	  of	  the	  political	  activity,	  the	  location	  of	  the	   central	   office,	   the	   Internet	   and	   E-­‐mail	   addresses	   of	   the	   organizations	   and,	   where	  possible,	  of	  the	  organization’s	  communication	  department.	  These	  email	  addresses	  were	  used	   as	   the	  mail	   out	   database	   for	   our	   online	   questionnaire.	   Data	   collection	   started	   in	  early	   2011	   in	   Switzerland	   and	   in	   spring	  2011	   in	  Germany,	   respectively.	   The	   response	  rate	   was	   40%	   for	   Switzerland	   (Completed	   questionnaires	   from	   985	   of	   the	   2475	  organisations	   the	   questionnaire	   was	   mailed	   to)	   and	   23%	   for	   Germany	   (Completed	  questionnaires	   from	  1246	  of	   the	  5422	  organisations	  the	  questionnaire	  was	  mailed	  to).	  However,	   many	   organizations	   did	   not	   complete	   the	   questionnaire,	   or	   left	   important	  information	  blank.	  Thus,	   for	  the	  models	   in	  this	  paper	  we	  are	   left	  with	  a	  dataset	  of	  673	  Swiss	   and	   574	  German	   organizations	  who	   provided	   all	   the	   necessary	   information.	   All	  data	  used	  in	  this	  paper,	  further	  described	  below,	  are	  derived	  from	  this	  survey	  dataset.	  	  	  	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  The	  dependent	  variables	  of	  this	  study	  are	  derived	  from	  lobbying	  strategies	  of	  Swiss	  and	  German	  interest	  groups.	  These	  groups	  were	  asked	  to	   indicate	  how	  important	  different	  addressees	   of	   communication	   and	   lobbying	   are	   for	   their	   organization.	   Survey	  participants	   had	   to	   indicate	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   following	   seven	   target	   audiences:	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government	   and	   administration,	   political	   parties,	   news	   media,	   citizens/the	   public,	  members	  of	  the	  organization,	  other	  interest	  groups,	  and	  scientific	  organizations.	  In	  each	  case	  the	  respondents	  assigned	  values	  between	  1	  (not	  important)	  to	  5	  (highly	  important).	  (Bayesian)	   Factor	   analysis	   reveals	   that	   underlying	   our	   seven	   variables	   are	   fewer	  dimensions	   of	   communications.	   According	   to	   the	   scree	   test,	   two	   factors	   should	   be	  retrieved	  from	  the	  data.	  These	  factors	  seem	  to	  capture	  the	  standard	  typology	  often	  used	  in	   the	   literature,	   i.e.	   inside	   lobbying	   versus	   outside	   lobbying.	   The	   variables	   Political	  Parties	  and	  Government	  load	  highly	  on	  the	  first	  factor	  (inside	  lobbying),	  while	  Members,	  Media,	   Citizens,	   and	   Interest	  Organizations	   exhibit	   high	   loadings	   for	   the	   second	   factor	  (outside	  lobbying).	  	  There	  are,	  however,	  reasons	  not	  to	  simply	  obtain	  the	  factor	  scores	  for	  these	  two	  factors	  and	  use	  them	  as	  dependent	  variables.	  First,	  Media	  and	  Government	  load	  relatively	  high	  on	   both	   factors,	   hence	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   some	   overlap	   between	   the	   two	   dimensions.	  Second,	   the	   Kaiser	   criterion	   indicates	   that	   three	   factors	   are	   required.	   Indeed,	   when	  repeating	   the	   analysis	  with	   three	   factors,	   the	   pattern	   becomes	   clearer	   (see	   Figure	   1).	  Again,	   Parties	   (0.513)	   and	   Government	   (0.763)	   load	   highly	   on	   the	   first	   factor	   (inside	  lobbying),	   while	   all	   other	   variables	   have	   low	   to	   very	   low	   factor	   loadings	   for	   inside	  strategies.	   The	   second	   factor	   (outside	   lobbying)	   is	   now	   mainly	   composed	   of	   Citizens	  (0.951)	   and	   Media	   (0.495).	   The	   third	   dimension	   instead	   consists	   mainly	   of	   Members	  (0.435)	   and	   Other	   Organizations	   (0.681).	   This	   last	   factor	   is	   therefore	   less	   a	   lobbying	  strategy	  than	  a	  form	  of	  communication	  with	  members	  and	  other	  pressure	  groups	  in	  the	  relevant	  field,	  a	  channel	  of	  information	  and	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  debate,	  and	  will	  not	  be	  analyzed	  further	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  clearer	  distinction	  between	  inside	  and	  outside	  lobbying	  we	  opt	  for	  the	  three-­‐dimensional	  factor	  analysis,	  but	  only	  use	  the	  variables	  representing	  the	  first	  two	  factors	  as	  dependent	   variables.	   	  We	  do	  not	   retrieve	   the	   factors	   and	  apply	   them	  as	  dependent	  variables,	   for	   the	   simple	   reason	   that	   the	  p-­‐value	   from	   the	   factor	  analysis	   is	   too	   low	   to	  lend	   credence	   to	   the	   derived	   factors.	   Thus,	   the	   factor	   analysis	   mostly	   confirms	   the	  theoretical	   assumption	   that	   communication	   with	   governments	   and	   political	   parties	  should	   fall	   into	   the	   inside	   lobbying	   category,	   while	   media	   communication	   and	   direct	  contact	   with	   citizens	   are	   outside	   lobbying	   tactics.	   Yet	   for	   the	   statistical	   analysis	   we	  prefer	   to	   retain	   the	  original	  variables,	   as	  we	  believe	   they	  are	  more	   reliable	  due	   to	   the	  low	   p-­‐value	   of	   the	   factor	   analysis	   mentioned	   above.	   Thus,	   we	   have	   four	   dependent	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variables,	   two	   for	   inside	   lobbying	   (Government	   and	   Parties)	   and	   two	   for	   outside	  lobbying	  (Citizens	  and	  Media),	  to	  test	  the	  four	  hypotheses	  described	  above.	  	  	  	  
	  	  Figure	   1:	   (Bayesian)	   Factor	   loadings	   for	   inside	   and	   outside	   lobbying	  
	  	  All	  four	  dependent	  variables	  (illustrated	  in	  Figure	  2)	  have	  the	  same	  basic	  data	  structure,	  i.e.	  they	  are	  divided	  into	  five	  categories,	  where	  a	  value	  of	  1	  indicates	  the	  lowest	  and	  5	  the	  highest	   importance.	  As	   can	  be	   seen	   from	   the	   figure,	   directly	   lobbying	   the	   government	  has	   the	   most	   equal	   distribution	   among	   the	   four	   dependent	   variables.	   Both	   extreme	  categories	  were	  named	   frequently	  by	   survey	   respondents,	   and	   the	  distribution	   is	  only	  slighly	   skewed.	   Outside	   lobbying	   via	   the	   media,	   and	   particularly	   directly	   lobbying	  political	   parties	   are	   instead	   quite	   heavily	   skewed	   to	   the	   right,	   as	   the	   lower	   two	  categories	  are	  not	  mentioned	  as	  frequently	  as	  the	  higher	  ones.	  Finally,	  directly	  lobbying	  citizens	  is	  skewed	  somewhat	  to	  the	  left,	  which	  is	  an	  indication	  that	  this	  outside	  lobbying	  tactic	   is	   not	   as	   important	   to	   the	   average	   interest	   organization	   in	   Germany	   and	  Switzerland	  as	  the	  other	  strategies.	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Figure	  2:	  The	  four	  dependent	  variables	  
	  	  	  We	  also	  find	  that	  the	  four	  lobbying	  tactics	  in	  question	  are	  used	  by	  different	  groups	  to	  a	  different	  degree.	  In	  other	  words,	  one	  strategy	  being	  important	  for	  an	  organization	  does	  not	  necessarily	  denote	  that	  the	  other	  strategies	  are	  important	  to	  that	  pressure	  groups	  as	  well	   (hence	   respondents	   did	   not	   simply	   press	   the	   same	   button	   repeatedly).	   The	  correlation	  table	  (Table	  1)	  shows	  that,	  as	  should	  be	  expected,	  the	  two	  inside	  strategies	  exhibit	   relatively	   high	   correlation.	   All	   the	   other	   pairs	   display	   only	   medium	   to	   low	  correlations,	  with	   the	   two	  outside	   lobbying	   tactics	  showing	   the	  second	  strongest	  of	  all	  pairs,	  but	  also	  only	  at	  0.44.	  	  	  
Table	  1:	  Correlation	  table	  of	  the	  four	  dependent	  variables	  
	   Government	   Parties	   Media	   Citizens	  
Government	   1	   0.589	   0.417	   0.299	  
Parties	   0.589	   1	   0.291	   0.156	  
Media	   0.417	   0.291	   1	   0.440	  
Citizens	   0.299	   0.156	   0.440	   1	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Independent	  variables:	  
Budget:	   Respondents	   to	   our	   survey	   also	   provided	   the	   annual	   budget	   of	   their	  organizations.	   This	   variable	   is	   our	   greatest	   concern	   in	   so	   far,	   as	   we	   have	   the	   largest	  number	  of	  missing	  values	  here	  as	  912	  of	  the	  participants	  decided	  not	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  question	   (only	   about	   300	   organizations	   did	   not	   reply	   to	   any	   of	   the	   other	   questions	  relevant	  for	  this	  paper).	  Thus,	  the	  question	  arises	  whether	  we	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  introducing	  a	  systematic	  bias	  into	  our	  analysis	  by	  simply	  excluding	  these	  912	  organizations	  from	  our	  dataset.	  As	  a	   first	  check,	  we	  compare	  the	  distributions	  of	   the	  four	  dependent	  variables	  for	   those	  observations	   in	   the	  dataset,	  and	   for	   those	  who	  were	  excluded	  (Table	  2).	  The	  excluded	   groups	   tend	   to	   fall	   into	   higher	   categories	   in	   all	   four	   cases	   (although	   this	  observation	  is	  quite	  weak	  in	  the	  citizens	  case).	  As	  we	  find	  that	  richer,	  better-­‐organized	  groups	   generally	   tend	   to	   attach	   higher	   importance	   to	   all	   four	   target	   audiences	   of	  lobbying	  (see	  results	  section	  below),	  this	  could	  be	  an	  indication	  of	  a	  systematic	  bias.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  we	   repeat	   the	   analysis	   discussed	  below	  but	   exclude	   the	   variable	   budget	  (thus	   reintroducing	  648	  observations	   into	   the	  models),	   and	   find	   that	  almost	  all	   of	  our	  non-­‐budget	   results	   are	   corroborated	   (see	   Appendix	   X	   for	   the	   results).	   Because	   of	   the	  heavily	  skewed	  distribution	  of	   the	  variable	  budget,	  we	  decided	  to	  use	  the	   logarithm	  in	  the	  models.	  
	  
Table	   2:	   Distribution	   of	   included	   and	   excluded	   observations	   for	   the	   dependent	  
variables	  








Very	   high	  
importance	  
Government	   in	  dataset	   5.77%	   8.58%	   23.34%	   31.44%	   30.87%	  
excluded	   7.02%	   7.86%	   18.87%	   30.19%	   36.06%	  
Parties	   in	  dataset	   13.95%	   19.09%	   24.54%	   24.86%	   17.56%	  
excluded	   12.79%	   16.46%	   20.44%	   26.83%	   23.48%	  
Media	   in	  dataset	   5.21%	   12.51%	   31.92%	   29.91%	   20.45%	  
excluded	   4.93%	   8.28%	   26.31%	   34.49%	   26.00%	  
Citizens	   in	  dataset	   13.95%	   32.96%	   30.23%	   14.92%	   7.94%	  
excluded	   11.53%	   27.78%	   34.17%	   18.34%	   8.18%	  	  
Membership:	  We	  divide	  membership	  into	  two	  categories.	  First,	  the	  number	  of	  individual	  persons	  is	  coded	  as	  individual	  membership,	  and	  second,	  group	  membership	  consists	  of	  other	   organizations	   and	   enterprises.	   The	   maximum	   individual	   membership	   in	   the	  dataset	   is	   2,700,000,	   while	   the	   highest	   number	   of	   group	   members	   is	   650,000.	   113	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organizations	  in	  the	  dataset	  do	  not	  have	  any	  members.	  Again,	  we	  take	  the	  logarithm	  of	  both	  variables	  for	  our	  models.	  	  	  
Political	   Competition:	   We	   asked	   organizations	   to	   assess	   the	   intensity	   of	   the	   political	  competition	  among	  interest	  groups	  in	  their	  field	  of	  activity.	  The	  five	  possible	  categories	  organizations	  could	  chose	  from	  were	  very	  weak	  (=1),	  weak	  (=2),	  moderate	  (=3),	  strong	  (=4),	   and	   very	   strong	   (=5).	   Political	   competition	   is	   included	   into	   the	   model	   as	   a	  categorical	  variable,	   thus	  we	  obtain	  separate	  estimates	   for	   the	  categories	  compared	  to	  the	  lowest	  one.	  	  	  
Groups:	   Respondents	   to	   the	   online	   survey	   were	   asked	   to	   define	   in	   which	   field	   their	  organizations	  mostly	   conduct	   work.	   393	   of	   the	   organization	   in	   the	   dataset	   chose	   the	  label	   “Business	   and	   Economic”,	   67	   are	   environmental	   organizations,	   and	   787	   fall	   into	  other	   categories.	   In	   Switzerland,	   237	   organizations	   fall	   into	   the	   business	   category	  (35.2%	  of	  Swiss	  groups	  in	  the	  dataset),	  while	   in	  Germany	  this	  number	  is	  156	  (27.1%).	  There	  are	  38	  and	  29	  environmental	  groups	  in	  Switzerland	  and	  Germany	  respectively,	  or	  about	   5%	   in	   each	   country.	   Finally,	   398	   groups	   in	   Switzerland	   and	   389	   in	   Germany	  represent	  neither	  business	  interests	  nor	  environmental	  concerns,	  and	  thus	  fall	  into	  the	  “Others”	  category.	  	  
Country:	  Finally,	  we	  include	  a	  country	  dummy	  into	  the	  model	  to	  account	  for	  systematic	  differences	  between	  Germany	  and	  Switzerland.	  As	  indicated,	  we	  have	  673	  Swiss	  and	  574	  German	  interest	  groups	  in	  the	  final	  dataset.	  Table	  3	  below	  provides	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	   the	   dependent	   and	   independent	   variables	   (not	   Country	   and	   Group,	   as	   these	  categorical	  variables	  are	  sufficiently	  described	  in	  the	  text).	  	  	  
Table	  3:	  Descriptive	  statistics	  of	  the	  dependent	  and	  independent	  variables	  
Variable	  name	   Obs.	   Mean	   s.d.	   Min.	   Max	  Government	  (importance)	  	   1247	   3.73	   1.16	   1	   5	  Parties	  (importance)	   1247	   3.13	   1.30	   1	   5	  Media	  (importance)	   1247	   2.70	   1.12	   1	   5	  Citizens	  (importance)	   1247	   3.48	   1.11	   1	   5	  Budget	  (log)	   1247	   12.36	   2.15	   6.91	   20.50	  Individual	  members	  (log)	   1247	   3.90	   3.51	   0	   13.38	  Group	  members	  (log)	   1247	   2.47	   2.59	   0	   15.53	  Political	  competition	   1247	   2.64	   0.96	   1	   5	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Discussion	  of	  Results:	  In	   this	   section	   we	   discuss	   the	   results	   from	   our	   analysis	   for	   the	   four	   hypotheses	  described	   above.	   Table	   4	   summarized	   the	   statistical	   findings	   and	   will	   repeatedly	   be	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  following	  discussion.	  	  
Resources:	  Both	   inside	   and	   outside	   lobbying	   tactics	   are	   costly,	   hence	   our	   expectation	   that	   rich	  organizations	   use	   both	   tactics	  more	   often	   than	   poorer	   ones	   can	   effort	   to	   do.	   Figure	   3	  shows	   the	   results	   in	   a	   descriptive,	   trivariate	  manner.	   Interest	   groups	   are	   divided	   into	  categories,	  from	  the	  poorest	  on	  the	  left	  to	  the	  richest	  on	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  of	  the	  sub-­‐graphs.	  The	  figures	  show	  the	  mean	  importance	  of	  lobbying	  targets	  for	  all	  groups	  in	  the	  thus	   formed	   categories,	   but	   also	   when	   subdivided	   into	   business,	   environmental,	   and	  other	  organizations.	  As	   expected,	   resource	  wealth	  has	   a	  distinct	   impact	  on	   their	   lobbying	  behavior.	  As	   can	  clearly	  be	  seen	  from	  Figure	  3	  the	  mean	  importance	  of	  lobbying	  the	  government,	  political	  parties,	  and	  the	  public	  (citizens)	  clearly	  increases,	  as	  organizations	  grow	  wealthier.	  This	  seems	   to	   be	   true	   overall,	   but	   also	   for	   the	   three	   sub-­‐groups	   of	   organizations.	   The	   one	  exception	  appears	  to	  be	  directly	  lobbying	  citizens,	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  almost	  flat	  except	  from	  a	  spike	  to	  the	  very	  right	  for	  the	  richest	  organizations	  (yet	  there	  are	  only	  very	  few	  organizations	  in	  these	  richest	  categories).	  	  The	  statistical	  models	  corroborate	  these	  findings	  derived	  from	  descriptive	  statistics.	  The	  variable	   Budget,	   capturing	   the	   annual	   income	   of	   an	   organization,	   is	   indeed	   highly	  significant	  (at	  the	  0.1%	  level)	  for	  both	  inside	  lobbying	  tactics	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  outside	  lobbying	   tactic	   of	   targeting	   the	  media.	   Addressing	   citizens,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   only	  significant	  at	  the	  5%	  level	  and	  has	  a	  much	  smaller	  effect,	  indicating	  that	  a	  higher	  budget	  effects	  targeting	  citizens	  directly	  much	  less	  than	  our	  other	  dependent	  variables.	  The	  explanation	   for	   this	  result	  might	  be	   that	  communication	  with	  citizens	   is	   relatively	  complicated	   even	   for	   rich	   organizations.	   Through	   a	   series	   of	   interviews	   with	   Swiss	  interest	   groups	  we	   know	   that	   reaching	   to	   citizens	   directly	   is	   not	   as	   common	   as	   other	  forms	   of	   lobbying	   (see	   also	   the	   left-­‐hand	   panel	   of	   Figure	   1),	   as	   it	   is	   much	   easier	   to	  directly	  appeal	  to	  policy	  makers	  or	  the	  media.	  Reaching	  out	  to	  citizens	  is	  not	  only	  costly,	  but	  also	  the	  effects	  are	  uncertain.	  We	  suspect	  this	  general	  weariness	  of	  communicating	  with	   citizens	   to	   be	   the	   reason	   why	   higher	   budgets	   do	   relatively	   little	   in	   terms	   of	  increasing	   lobbying	  efforts	  towards	  citizens.	  Additionally,	  as	  we	  see	   in	  table	  2,	  citizens	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generally	  tend	  to	  be	  of	  rather	  low	  importance	  in	  the	  communication	  of	  interest	  groups.	  As	  interest	  groups	  do	  not	  compete	  in	  elections,	  they	  do	  not	  need	  the	  support	  of	  citizens	  as	   much	   as	   political	   parties	   might	   do.	   For	   interest	   groups,	   the	   support	   from	   their	  members	   and	   their	   respective	   constituencies	   seems	   to	   be	  more	   important.	   This	   could	  further	   explain	  why	   even	   rich	   organizations	   do	   not	   rely	   as	   heavily	   on	   communication	  with	  citizens	  as	  we	  might	  expect.	  	  
Table	  4:	  Results	  from	  the	  Ordered	  Logit	  Models:	  
	  
Inside Lobbying Outside Lobbying
Government Parties Media Citizens
Environmental groups 0.49⇤ 0.11 0.25 0.73⇤⇤
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23)
Other groups  0.04 0.00  0.02 0.63⇤⇤⇤
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Budget 0.24⇤⇤⇤ 0.20⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Indiv. members  0.06⇤⇤⇤  0.01 0.02 0.03⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Corp. members 0.01 0.05⇤  0.01  0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Competition (Low) 0.25 0.48⇤⇤ 0.08 0.19
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Competition (Medium) 1.00⇤⇤⇤ 1.34⇤⇤⇤ 0.44⇤ 0.43⇤
(0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
Competition (High) 1.33⇤⇤⇤ 1.67⇤⇤⇤ 0.65⇤⇤ 0.61⇤⇤
(0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
Competition (Very high) 1.47⇤⇤⇤ 2.48⇤⇤⇤ 0.79⇤ 1.19⇤⇤⇤
(0.36) (0.38) (0.36) (0.36)
Country dummy (D=1) 0.30⇤⇤ 0.75⇤⇤⇤ 0.58⇤⇤⇤ 0.40⇤⇤⇤
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
1—2 0.52 1.77⇤⇤⇤  0.23  0.72⇤⇤⇤
(0.37) (0.35) (0.37) (0.21)
2—3 1.58⇤⇤⇤ 3.04⇤⇤⇤ 1.18⇤⇤⇤ 1.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.21)
3—4 3.02⇤⇤⇤ 4.23⇤⇤⇤ 2.80⇤⇤⇤ 2.46⇤⇤⇤
(0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.22)
4—5 4.53⇤⇤⇤ 5.67⇤⇤⇤ 4.26⇤⇤⇤ 3.74⇤⇤⇤
(0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (0.24)
AIC 3383.81 3700.33 3561.93 3647.35
BIC 3455.60 3772.12 3633.72 3719.14
Log Likelihood  1677.90  1836.17  1766.97  1809.68
Num. obs. 1246 1246 1246 1246
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
2
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Figure	  3:	  Effects	  of	  resource	  wealth	  on	  lobbying	  strategies	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correctly	   predicted	   and	   499	   are	   only	   one	   off	   by	   one	   category.	   Thus,	   only	   246	  observations	   are	   wrongly	   predicted	   by	  more	   than	   one	   category,	   less	   than	   20%	   of	   all	  observations.	  Overall,	  the	  model	  seems	  to	  capture	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  data	  well,	  and	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  hypothesis	  1	  is	  substantiated.	  	  
Figure	  4:	  Predicted	  effect	  of	  an	  organization’s	  on	  the	  probability	  on	  lobbying	  the	  
government	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relies	   more	   on	   pressuring	   the	   government	   indirectly	   via	   the	   possibility	   of	   activating	  their	   members	   and	   less	   by	   directly	   trying	   to	   influence	   governmental	   decisions.	   The	  effect	  is	  not	  too	  large,	  but	  at	  around	  7%	  (for	  a	  one	  point	  increase	  in	  membership)	  twice	  as	  strong	  as	  the	  effect	  towards	  lobbying	  media	  organizations	  and	  journalists.	  We	  do	  not	  find	  significant	  effects	  for	  lobbying	  political	  parties	  and	  citizens.	  Thus,	  hypothesis	  2a	  is	  only	  partially	  substantiated.	  Higher	   group	  membership	   increases,	   as	   hypothesized,	   organizations’	   effort	   to	   directly	  lobby	   political	   parties.	   Again,	   the	   effect	   is	   significant,	   but	   relatively	   small,	   i.e.	   the	  distribution	   of	   organizations	   among	   the	   5	   categories	   of	   importance	   does	   not	   change	  dramatically	  as	  group	  membership	  increases	  (see	  Figure	  5).	  We	  do	  not	  find	  a	  significant	  effect	  for	  lobbying	  the	  government	  as	  group	  membership	  increases.	  However,	  this	  effect	  is	  the	  one	  that	  exhibits	  the	  most	  notable	  change	  when	  we	  drop	  the	  variable	  budget	  and	  thus	  increase	  the	  sample	  size	  by	  around	  650	  observations.	  Firstly,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  effect	  more	   than	   doubles	   for	   lobbying	   political	   parties,	   and	   secondly,	   the	   effect	   is	   highly	  significant	   for	   lobbying	   the	   government	   as	   well	   (see	   Appendix	   1).	   The	   correlation	  between	  an	  organization’s	  budget	  and	  group	  membership	   in	   the	  dataset	   is	  only	  0.199.	  Hence	  we	  believe	  that	  group	  membership	  only	  partly	  picks	  up	  the	  variation	  otherwise	  explained	  by	  budget,	  when	  the	   latter	   is	  omitted	   from	  the	  model.	   Instead,	   it	  seems	  that	  the	  added	  observations	  systematically	  change	  the	  model	  for	  group	  membership,	  yet	  not	  for	   the	   other	   variables	   in	   the	   model.	   Overall,	   we	   conclude	   that	   hypothesis	   2b	   is	  supported,	   although	   with	   the	   caveat	   that	   for	   lobbying	   the	   government	   the	   increased	  sample	  size	  is	  needed	  to	  reveal	  the	  hypothesized	  effect.	  	  
Level	  of	  competition:	  Next	  we	   turn	   to	   hypothesis	   4	   and	   the	   level	   of	   competition	   interest	   groups	   face.	   First,	  note	   that	   for	   all	   four	   lobbying	   targets	   the	   important	   increases	   for	   every	   increase	   in	  intensity	   of	   the	   competition.	   In	   other	   words,	   we	   obtain	   separate	   estimates	   for	   every	  category	   of	   competition	   and	   find	   groups	   facing	   the	   highest	   competition	   are	   also	  estimated	   to	  attach	   the	  highest	   importance	   to	  all	   lobbying	   targets.	  Next	   in	   line	  are	   the	  groups	   facing	  high	   competition,	   followed	  by	  medium	   competition,	  while	   low	  and	   very	  low	  competition	  groups	  attach	  least	  importance	  to	  all	  targets	  of	  lobbying	  (see	  Table	  4).	  However,	  not	  all	  levels	  of	  competition	  are	  always	  significantly	  different	  from	  each	  other,	  e.g.	   the	   lowest	   two	   classes	   only	   significantly	   change	   lobbying	   importance	   for	   political	  parties.	   In	   general,	   the	   very	   low	   and	   low	   competition	   categories	   (Government,	  Media,	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and	   Citizens),	   and	   also	   the	   high	   and	   very	   high	   categories	   (Government,	   Media)	   show	  some	  overlap	  and	  are	  not	  significantly	  discernable	  from	  each	  other.	  For	  addressing	  the	  media,	   the	   medium	   and	   high	   competition	   categories	   do	   not	   significantly	   change	   the	  lobbying	  behavior	  according	  to	  the	  models.	  Yet	  in	  general,	  as	  the	  competition	  increases,	  all	  four	  targets	  of	  lobbying	  are	  more	  important	  for	  the	  average	  pressure	  group.	  	  
	  
Figure	  5:	  Effect	  of	  corporate	  membership	  on	  lobbying	  political	  parties	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lobbying	  is	  more	  strongly	  effected	  by	  competition	  than	  outside	  lobbying.	  However,	  the	  effects	   are	   clearly	   present	   and	   significant	   in	   all	   four	   models,	   hence	   hypothesis	   4	   is	  substantiated.	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Surprisingly,	   environmental	   groups	   tend	   to	   tend	   to	   use	   inside	   lobbying	   strategies	   –	  particular	   lobbying	  the	  government	  –	  more	  heavily	  than	  the	  other	  two.	  This	  can	  nicely	  be	   seen	   in	  Figures	  4	  and	  6.	  For	  political	  parties	   and	   the	  media,	   the	   lines	   for	   the	   three	  group	  types	  tend	  to	  follow	  the	  overall	  trend.	  In	  the	  government	  graphs	  (top-­‐left	  figures),	  on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   line	   representing	   environmental	   groups	   floats	   above	   the	   other	  lines	  over	  most	  of	  the	  plotting	  range.	  Overall,	  these	  findings	  are	  not	  very	  strong	  (and	  not	  always	  have	  the	  expected	  directions).	  Our	  hypothesis	  4	  must	  therefore	  be	  rejected.	  
	  
	  
Conclusions	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  examine	  the	  lobbying	  strategies	  of	  Swiss	  and	  German	  interest	  groups,	  and	  in	  particular	  we	  investigated	  which	  characteristics	  induce	  organizations	  to	  intensify	  their	  use	  of	  inside	  and	  outside	  lobbying	  tactics.	  We	  contribute	  to	  the	  literature	  one	  the	  one	  hand	  by	  more	  thoroughly	  analyzing	  a	  dataset	  on	  German	  and	  Swiss	  interest	  groups	  introduced	   earlier	   (ECPR	   General	   Conference,	   Reykjavik,	   2011),	   but	   also	   by	   applying	  new	  modeling	   techniques	   (ordered	   logit	  models)	   so	   far	   not	   used	   in	   lobbying	   strategy	  research.	  	  We	  find	  strong	  evidence	  that	  resource	  wealth	  (the	  budget)	  of	  an	  organization	  strongly	  influences	  the	  lobbying	  behavior	  of	  organization.	  Richer	  groups	  are	  able	  to	  spend	  more	  on	  both	   inside	   and	  outside	   lobbying,	   and	  our	  models	   suggest	   that	   this	   is	   exactly	  what	  they	   do,	   as	   both	   tactics	   grow	   in	   importance,	   as	   organizations	   get	   wealthier,	   yet	   as	  expected,	   the	   effect	   is	   stronger	   for	   inside	   lobbying.	   The	   implication	   is	   that,	   although	  inside	  and	  outside	  lobbying	  tactics	  are	  used	  more	  frequently	  by	  richer	  organizations,	  the	  preference	  of	  groups	  is	  to	  directly	  lobby	  decision	  makers	  when	  they	  have	  enough	  money	  at	  hand	  to	  do	  so.	  We	  also	  observe	  that	  groups	  facing	  more	  competition	  from	  other	  organizations	  are	  more	  active	   regarding	   both	   inside	   and	   outside	   lobbying.	   The	   higher	   the	   competition	   in	   the	  field	   of	   activity,	   the	   more	   organizations	   apply	   both	   strategies,	   yet	   again	   this	   effect	   is	  stronger	   for	   inside	   lobbying.	   For	   the	   impact	   membership	   (both	   of	   individuals	   and	   of	  other	  organizations),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  evidence	  provided	  by	  our	  models	  in	  favor	  of	  our	  hypotheses	  is	  relatively	  weak.	  We	  therefore	  conclude	  that	  group	  behavior	  is	  indeed	  not	   the	   same	   when	   in	   comes	   to	   political	   lobbying,	   and	   that	   their	   choice	   of	   lobbying	  strategy	   depends	   heavily	   on	   characteristics	   such	   as	   resource	   wealth	   and	   the	   level	   of	  political	  competition	  in	  their	  field.	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Annex	  1:	  The	  models	  without	  budget	  (N	  increases	  by	  ~650)	  
	  
	  
Inside Lobbying Outside Lobbying
Government Parties Media Citizens
Environmental groups 0.18  0.17 0.03 0.72⇤⇤⇤
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20)
Other groups  0.22⇤  0.16†  0.25⇤⇤ 0.52⇤⇤⇤
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Indiv. members  0.06⇤⇤⇤  0.01 0.01 0.04⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Corp. members 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.03† 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Competition (Low) 0.34⇤ 0.51⇤⇤⇤ 0.16 0.11
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Competition (Medium) 1.15⇤⇤⇤ 1.35⇤⇤⇤ 0.58⇤⇤⇤ 0.38⇤
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Competition (High) 1.45⇤⇤⇤ 1.66⇤⇤⇤ 0.87⇤⇤⇤ 0.56⇤⇤
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Competition (Very high) 1.51⇤⇤⇤ 2.26⇤⇤⇤ 1.11⇤⇤⇤ 0.95⇤⇤⇤
(0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27)
Country dummy (D=1) 0.38⇤⇤⇤ 0.72⇤⇤⇤ 0.59⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
1—2  2.13⇤⇤⇤  0.59⇤⇤⇤  2.40⇤⇤⇤  1.00⇤⇤⇤
(0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17)
2—3  1.12⇤⇤⇤ 0.62⇤⇤⇤  1.03⇤⇤⇤ 0.76⇤⇤⇤
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
3—4 0.19 1.70⇤⇤⇤ 0.56⇤⇤⇤ 2.22⇤⇤⇤
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
4—5 1.62⇤⇤⇤ 3.08⇤⇤⇤ 2.01⇤⇤⇤ 3.55⇤⇤⇤
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19)
AIC 5209.51 5712.28 5386.59 5539.65
BIC 5281.62 5784.38 5458.70 5611.76
Log Likelihood  2591.76  2843.14  2680.30  2756.83
Num. obs. 1894 1894 1894 1894
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
3
